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Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2006). After-acquired title passes. 
(1) If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting to 
convey the same in fee simple absolute, and at the time of the conveyance 
the person does not have the legal estate in the real estate, but afterwards 
acquires the same: 
(a) the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to 
the grantee, the grantee's heirs, successors, or assigns; and 
(b) the conveyance shall be as valid as if the legal estate had been in 
the grantor at the time of the conveyance. 
(2) (a) Subsection (1) applies to a conveyance by: 
(i) warranty deed; 
(ii) special warranty deed; or 
(iii) trust deed, 
(b) Subsection (1) does not apply to a conveyance by quitclaim deed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103 (2006). Effect of failure to record 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
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valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdicti r: • : \; i - :r a I i ;.• •' ; —•. 
to Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(j) because the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
matter to the Court of Appeals. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
Question 1: Was it error for the lower court to apply the doctrine of 
after-acquired title to conclude that a first party had a higher priority 
security interest in real property than a second party, where (1) the first 
part) obtained and recorded a trust deed from a non-owner, (2) the 
second party subsequently obtained and recorded a \vust deed from the 
actual owner, and (3) lastly, the non-owner acquired a special warranty 
deed from the actual owner? 
Question 2: Was it error for the lower court to conclude that the 
recording of a Deed of'Trust, executed by an individual that did not own 
the property at issue, gave constructive notice as of the date of its 
recording to a third party who subsequently received a valid Deed of 
Trust from the property's true owner? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On an appeal from summary judgment, this Court '"grant[s] the trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness.'" GLFP. Ltd. v. 
CL Management. Ltd.. 163 P.3d 636, 639 (Utah App. 2007) (quoting Arnold 
Industries. Inc. v. Love. 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002)). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE IN TRIAL COURT 
"[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue." Daniels v. Gamma West Brachvtherapv. LLC. 221 P.3d 256, 2645 (Utah 
2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Appellants have preserved 
the instantly presented issue for appeal by raising the issue before the trial court by 
way of cross-motions for summary judgment before the lower court. (R. at 1174-
81.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case comes before the Court on appeal from the lower court's 
December 3,2009 Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment as to the Validity and Enforceability of the Lien of Plaintiffs' 
Deed of Trust and Defendant Brad Taylor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
("Lower Court Decision"). The lower court found in favor of Plaintiff, ruling that 
2 
Plaintiffs interest in the subject property is superior to Defendant Brad Taylor's 
interest. 
The following facts are relevant to the issues on appeal: 
1. In the Spring of 2006, Ryan Andersen approached Brad Taylor about 
borrowing moi • nrJiuse proper!) m Rivenon, Utah. (R. at 711.) Brad Taylor 
ultimately agreed to loan money to Gary McDonald and Ryan Andersen and G&L 
Mac, Inc. ("G&L Mac"). 14 
2. Gary McDonald and Ryan Andersen executed a Deed of Trust in favor of 
Bradford '1 ayloi on June 1, 2006 to secure the $335,000 note. (R. at 712.) The 
Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents was recorded with the Salt Lake County 
Recorder on June 5,2006. Id 
3. On June 2,2006, Gary McDonald, in his individual capacity, executed a 
Construction Loan Deed of Trust in the amount of $1,704,375.00, in favor of 
PlaintiffCente-r. • .'U.-K . •>• .
 / ; - v . ,-je,, c. June 2,2006, as Entry 
No. 9742028, in Book 9303, at Page 2800 (hereinafter "Centennial Deed of 
Trust"). (R. at 918.) 
4. Until several months later, Brad Taylor was unaware that the Deed of Trust 
and Assignment of Rents thai he obtained as security for his loan had not actually 
been recorded until four days later on June 5. 2006. i R. at 7\~\.) lie is uncertain as 
to why the Deed of Trust was not recorded on June 1st as per his agreement with 
Gary McDonald, Ryan Andersen and G&L Mac, and his specific instructions to 
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First Southwestern Title Agency. Id He believed that it had been recorded on June 
1,2006. Id 
5. Brad Taylor did not agree to subrogate his loan to the one Gary McDonald 
and Ryan Andersen would subsequently obtain from Centennial Bank. (R. at 714.) 
6. Ryan Andersen, while not personally owning the property at issue, 
individually executed a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents in favor of 
Defendant Casey Florence, which was then recorded on June 15, 2006, as Entry 
Number 9757188, in Book 9310, at Page 342 (hereinafter the "Florence Deed of 
Trust"). (R. at 919.) 
7. Brad Taylor subsequently learned that the property was not owned by either 
Gary McDonald or Ryan Andersen, but owned by G&L Mac, Inc. (R. at 714.) At 
about that same time, Ryan Andersen approached Brad Taylor about loaning an 
additional $100,000 for the sewer bond on the same project. Id 
8. Brad Taylor subsequently loaned an additional $100,000 to G&L Mac and 
Ryan Andersen for the sewer bond, based on the understanding that he would get 
the bond back in full from the City of Riverton when the project was completed. 
(R. at 715.) Ryan Andersen confirmed that understanding. Id. 
9. On September 5, 2006 Gary McDonald of G&L Mac. (on behalf of G&L 
Mac) and Ryan Andersen (individually) executed a note secured by deed of trust in 
the amount of $435,000 that was intended to secure the note of June 1, 2006 and 
secure the additional money Brad Taylor lent for the sewer bond. (R. at 715.) 
4 
10. >• ^J .: . .. _ > !" •'icV' ' • .,-. ••••' .' .';-. .rrnperty at issue, 
executed a Deed of Trust with Assignments of Rents in favor of Defendant 
Bradford E. Taylor, which was recorded on September 6, 2006, as Entry No. 
9836108, in Book 9347, at Page 429 to secure both loans on the property for a total 
rep;j\menl oi $4:o,000 b\ lunc I. JwV/ iK. at 420 ) 
11. Brad Taylor had no knowledge of or concern that his L\C.Q6 would not Ix in a 
first position. (R. at 715-16.) 
12. On December 22, 2006, Centennial Bank recorded a Special Warranty Deed 
executed bv G&i. Mac in favor of Gary McDonald, in Book 9398, at Pages 9216-
9217. (R. at 614-15, 1235.) 
13. Bradford Taylor and Centennial Bank both moved for summary judgment as 
to the priority of their respective claims against the property. (R. at 1141.) 
14. On December 3, 2009, the lower court entered a memorandum wherein 
concluded thai the June 2. 200o recording of the interest granted by then non-
owner Gary McDonald to Centennial Bank was constructive notice of Centennial 
Bank's interest as of the date of recording. (R. at 1236.) 
! j>. In its memorandum decision, the lower court held further that pursuant to the 
doctrine of after-acquired title, the Special Warranty Deed of December 22, 2006 
had the effect of securing an interest in the propertv lo Centennial Bank as of June 
2, 2006 despite the fact that the true owner in interest (G&L Mac) had conveyed a 
5 
Deed of Trust to Bradford Taylor more than 3 months before conveying to 
McDonald. (R. at 1235-36.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Taylor's September 5, 2006 Deed of Trust is superior to Centennial's June 2, 
2006 Deed of Trust because (1) while Centennial may have acquired from 
McDonald, under Utah's after-acquired title statute, some interest dating to June 2, 
2006, such interest was subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust 
because McDonald could transfer or encumber only the interest that he 
subsequently acquired and (2) even if Centennial's June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust is 
not subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust, Utah's race-notice statute 
protects Taylor as a subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, who recorded 
first. 
Centennial claims that its interest is superior to Taylor's September 6, 2006 
interest because (1) the June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust from McDonald to Centennial 
was initially invalid because McDonald had no interest to grant; (2) when G&L 
conveyed its interest to McDonald on December 22, 2006 via Special Warranty 
Deed, Utah's after-acquired title statute applied to make the June 2, 2006 Deed of 
Trust from McDonald to Centennial valid despite an intervening encumbrance on 
title, such that the June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust was executed as if, at the time of 
execution, McDonald held all of G&L's June 2, 2006 interest in the Property; and 
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(3) because Centennial received and recorded its Special-Warranty-Deed interest 
from McDonald on June 2, 2006, Utah's race-notice statute does not protect 
Taylor's September 6, 20061 Deed of Trust because Taylor somehow had 
constructive notice of the interest granted by a non-owner third-party to Centennial 
at the time he obtained the Deed of Trust on September 6, 2006. 
However, Centennial's legal theory fails for several reasons: (1) 
Centennial's interest via after-acquired title is limited to the interest McDonald 
subsequently acquired, which was clearly subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 
Deed of Trust; (2) allowing the doctrine of after-acquired title to secure an interest 
that McDonald never acquired would be illogical and unfair; (3) Utah's race-notice 
recording system protects Taylor; and (4) Centennial's legal theory contravenes 
public policy by clouding title and discouraging alienability of real property. 
Utah's after-acquired title statute passed to Centennial an interest subject to 
Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust. Statutory text, case law, and property 
treatises all confirm that Utah's after-acquired title statute passes only the interest 
subsequently obtained by the grantor. McDonald's subsequently-acquired interest 
was subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of trust because McDonald did 
not obtain its interest until December 22, 2006—after Taylor acquired and 
recorded his September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust. Because Utah's after-acquired title 
statute passes only the interest subsequently obtained by the grantor, and 
The Deed of Trust was executed on September 5,2006 and recorded on September 6,2006, but is referenced 
herein as the September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust for simplicity. 
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McDonald's subsequently-acquired interest was subject to Taylor's September 5, 
2006 Deed of Trust, Centennial received from McDonald only what McDonald 
had acquired: an interest subject to Taylor's September 5, 2006 Deed of Trust. 
The lower court erred by allowing the doctrine of after-acquired title to 
secure an interest against a property interest that McDonald never acquired. Such a 
liberal interpretation of Utah's after-acquired title statute turns the recording statute 
on its ear, ignoring common sense application of notice and due process, and has 
the potential to undermine all conveyances, which would remain subject to any 
asserted interest previously "created" by a conveyance document from a non-
owner third party in anticipation of obtaining an interest in the property at some 
future date. 
Utah's race-notice recording system protects Taylor as a subsequent 
purchaser for value, without notice of any prior valid interest in the property, who 
recorded first. When Taylor recorded his Deed of Trust on September 6, 2006, he 
was the first to record a valid instrument and he had no notice of any other valid 
instrument securing a prior interest in the property. 
Centennial's advocated legal theory contravenes public policy by clouding 
title and discouraging alienability of real property. If Centennial's theory 
accurately reflects the law, then any non-party can cloud title and discourage 
alienation by simply recording an invalid conveyance of land by a party that does 
not own it. 
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Because Taylor acquired and recorded a first Deed of Trust before 
Centennial, Taylor's Deed of Trust is superior to Centennial's Deed of Trust. 
ARGUMENT 
Centennial's flawed legal theory, under which Centennial claims a deed of 
trust superior to Taylor's deed of trust, comprises: (1) The June 2, 2006 Deed of 
Trust from McDonald to Centennial was initially invalid because McDonald had 
no interest to grant. (2) When G&L Mac conveyed its interest to McDonald on 
December 22,2006 via Special Warranty Deed, Utah's after-acquired title statute 
applied and instantaneously made the June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust from McDonald 
to Centennial valid despite the existence of an intervening interest encumbering 
title, such that the June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust was executed as if, at the time of 
execution, McDonald held all of G&L Mac's June 2,2006 interest in the Property. 
(3) Because Centennial received from McDonald and recorded a Special-
Warranty-Deed interest on June 2, 2006, Utah's race-notice statute does not protect 
Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust because Taylor must have had 
constructive notice of the interest granted by a non-owner third-party to Centennial 
at the time he obtained the Deed of Trust on September 6, 2006. 
For several reasons, Centennial's legal theory fails: (1) Utah's after-acquired 
title stature passed only the interest subsequently obtained by McDonald, and 
McDonald's subsequently-acquired interest was subject to Taylor's September 6, 
2006 Deed of Trust; (2) it was error for the trial court to allow the doctrine of after-
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acquired title to pass a fee simple title that the grantor never acquired; (3) Utah's 
race-notice recording system protects Taylor as a subsequent lender for value, 
without notice, who recorded first; and (4) Centennial's advocated legal theory 
contravenes public policy by clouding title and discouraging alienability of real 
property. 
I. BECAUSE UTAH'S AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE STATUTE PASSES 
ONLY THOSE PROPERTY INTERESTS SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED 
BY THE GRANTOR, AND FURTHER BECAUSE MCDONALD, THE 
GRANTOR, SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED AN INTEREST SUBJECT 
TO TAYLOR'S PROPERLY RECORDED DEED OF TRUST, THE 
AFTER ACQUIRED-TITLE STATUTE SECURED IN CENTENNIAL 
ONLY A DEED OF TRUST ON A PROPERTY INTEREST THAT WAS 
ALREADY SUBJECT TO TAYLOR'S DEED OF TRUST. 
Because Utah's after-acquired title statute passes only those property 
interests subsequently obtained by the grantor, and McDonald, the grantor, 
subsequently merely obtained an interest subject to Taylor's properly recorded 
Deed of Trust, Utah's after acquired-title statute secures in Centennial only a Deed 
of Trust on a Property interest that was already subject to Taylor's Deed of Trust. 
The unambiguous plain English meaning of the language of § 57-1-10, Utah case 
law, and authoritative property treatises are in agreement that the after-acquired 
property doctrine passes only those property interests that the grantor subsequently 
obtains. Because the grantor, McDonald, subsequently acquired an interest via a 
Special Warranty Deed subject to Taylor's Deed of Trust, the after-acquired title 
doctrine passed to Centennial a Deed of Trust on Property which was already 
10 
encumbered by Taylor's earlier, valid, recorded, and therefore superior, Deed of 
Trust. 
A. Because the language of § 57-1-10 limits after-acquired title to the 
grantor's subsequently-acquired interest, the statute could not 
secure in Centennial a right superior to Brad Taylor's interest 
because McDonald never acquired such an interest. 
§ 57-1-10 states, in pertinent part: 
If any person conveys any real estate by conveyance purporting 
to convey the same in [trust deed] and at the time of the 
conveyance the person does not have the legal estate in the real 
estate, but afterwards acquires the same . . . the legal estate 
subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2006). 
The qualifier, "legal estate subsequently acquired," refers in plain English to 
the interest that the grantor subsequently acquired, and not to the interest that the 
grantor purportedly conveyed to the grantee before acquiring the interest. It is thus 
linguistically impossible to find that an interest not subject to the Taylor Deed of 
Trust was passed under § 57-1-10. Such a construction would require a rewrite of 
the statute, e.g., replacing "subsequently acquired" with "purportedly conveyed." 
But this amendment by itself would still fail to effectuate Centennial's desired 
outcome because "afterwards acquires the same" would also have to be amended 
to something more like: "afterwards acquires some of the same." Without such 
changes to its language, § 57-1-10 would not vest in Centennial anything more 
than what McDonald received on December 22, 2006 because McDonald acquired 
11 
only a legal interest in the Property subject to Taylor's previously perfected Deed 
of Trust interest. 
An interest superior to Taylor's interest was never "afterwards acquired" by 
McDonald because G&L Mac's interest was already subject to Taylor's interest 
when the Special Warranty Deed to McDonald was recorded on Dec. 22, 2006. 
While the unambiguous text of § 57-1-10 may facilitate the passing of some 
interest to Centennial, the statute did not pass an interest superior to that held by 
Taylor because McDonald never acquired such an interest. 
B. Utah case law holds that § 57-1-10 limits after-acquired title to the 
grantor's subsequently acquired interest. 
In applying the after-acquired title statute, the Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted § 57-1-10 consistent with the statute's clear and unambiguous language 
limiting after-acquired interests to the grantor's subsequently acquired interest in 
the property. '"The use of the warranty deed in this case not only assured 
conveyance of all the vendors' current interest, but would also automatically 
transfer to the grantees or their successors any "legal estate subsequently 
acquired." Such is the effect of our statute, as well as the related doctrine of 
estoppel by deed.'" Arnold Indus, v. Love. 63 P.3d 721, 726 (Utah 2002) (quoting 
Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 228 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added).2 "[E]stoppel 
by deed operates only where the conveyance is intended to convey a particular 
2
 Arnold Indus, v. Love also confirms that the terms "estoppel by deed" and "after-acquired property" are 
interchangeable: "[E]quitable doctrine of estoppel by deed [is] sometimes referred to as the doctrine of after-
acquired title." Arnold Indus, v. Love. 63 P.2d 721, 726 (Utah 2002). 
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estate, which the grantor subsequently acquires." Dowse v. Kammerman, 246 
P.2d 881, 882 (Utah 1952) (emphasis added). Other states agree that the after-
acquired-title doctrine conveys only that which the grantor subsequently acquires. 
Centennial's interpretation of the after-acquired title doctrine would 
effectively utilize the equitable doctrine to automatically transfer to the grantees or 
their successors a fee simple interest in the subject property regardless of what 
legal estate was subsequently acquired by the grantor. Such an inequitable result 
defies logic as well as the function and purpose of the race-notice system in Utah. 
C. Property treatises also recognize that after-acquired property is 
limited to interests subsequently acquired by the grantor. 
In searching property treatises, Counsel for Taylor have not encountered 
(and suspect that none exists) any characterization of the after-acquired title 
doctrine that would pass interests to the grantee in excess of those interests 
subsequently acquired by the grantor. All such characterizations encountered use 
wording that is at least as explicit as § 57-1-10 in limiting the after-acquired 
interest. "The after-acquired title doctrine states that title acquired by a grantor, 
who previously attempted to convey title to land which the grantor did not in fact 
own, inures automatically to the benefit of prior grantees." Thompson on Real 
Property, Thomas Edition § 82.11 (1994). Some characterizations are even more 
explicit: "[T]he doctrine can apply only to such title as a grantor subsequently 
acquires; if his obligation relates to the entire fee and he acquires a life estate only 
3
 E.g., Premier Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bent. 214 P.3d 574, 580 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). 
13 
or merely a half interest, it is only this interest which can pass to his grantee by 
inurement; if he acquires title subject to a mortgage to a third party, it would 
pass in that form to his grantee." American Law of Property § 15.22 (Title by 
Estoppel), at 851, (1952) (emphasis added). 
Because the grantor, McDonald, subsequently acquired a mere Special 
Warranty Deed subject to Taylor's Deed of Trust, the after-acquired property 
doctrine passed to Centennial an interest in Property that was already subject to 
Taylor's earlier and validly perfected Deed of Trust. Taylor obtained a valid Deed 
of Trust from G&L on September 5, 2006 and recorded the same on September 6, 
2006. Three months later, on December 22, 2006, McDonald obtained and 
recorded a Special Warranty Deed from G&L Mac. Because G&L Mac's interest 
on December 22, 2006 was subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust, 
G&L conveyed to McDonald an interest in the Property subject to Taylor's 
September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust. Because the doctrine of after-acquired title 
conveys at most what is later obtained by the grantor, and McDonald obtained a 
Deed of Trust in a Property interest that was subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 
Deed of Trust, the doctrine of after-acquired title could have at most conveyed to 
Centennial, through Centennial's June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust from McDonald, an 
interest in Property subject to Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust. Thus, 
Taylor's interest is superior to Centennial's interest in the Property. 
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II. CENTENNIAL'S ASSERTION, THAT AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE 
PASSES THE ENTIRE INTEREST PURPORTEDLY CONVEYED IN 
THE ORIGINAL GRANT. RESULTS IN AN UNACCEPTABLE 
ABSURDITY BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL GRANTEE RECEIVES A 
PROPERTY INTEREST GREATER THAN WHAT THE ORIGINAL 
GRANTOR SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRES. 
In addition to contradicting the text and judicial interpretation of § 57-1-10, 
as well as apparently all property law treatises, Centennial's assertion, that after-
acquired title passes the entire interest purportedly conveyed in the original grant, 
results in an unacceptable result: the original grantee receives a property interest 
greater than what the original grantor subsequently acquired. Under the instant 
facts, the absurdity of Centennial's position is not so obvious: Party Z (McDonald), 
having no interest in the subject property, conveys a deed of trust to Party B 
(Centennial), who promptly records. Party C (G&L), the actual owner of the 
subject property, subsequently conveys a deed of trust to Party D (Taylor), who 
promptly records. Thereafter Z obtains a special warranty deed from C, with the 
result being that B has successfully obtained a deed of trust secured against the fee 
interest in the property, and D has a mere deed of trust subject to B's deed of trust 
despite having obtained his interest from the true title owner. 
The following scenario more clearly exposes the extreme absurdity of 
Centennial's theory. Z, without any interest, conveys subject property to B via 
special warranty deed. C, the actual owner of the subject property, subsequently 
conveys to D via special warranty deed. C then conveys to Z a one-year leasehold 
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beginning in 1000 years—a virtually worthless interest. Under Centennial's legal 
theory, because Z later acquired an interest (although a virtually worthless 
interest), the after-acquired title statute would function to pass the entire fee simple 
interest in the property to B. It is absurd to think that after-acquired title works to 
pass all property interests to an original grantee when the original grantor 
subsequently obtained only a portion of the entire fee property interest. Although 
not as egregious as miraculously using the doctrine to create a fee simple interest 
out of a virtually worthless interest, Centennial is attempting in this case to use the 
equitable doctrine of after-acquired title to illogically convert the subordinate 
interest that McDonald obtained from G&L Mac in December 2006 into a fee 
interest that enjoys a first position ahead of a prior encumbrance held by Brad 
Taylor. 
III.UTAH'S RACE-NOTICE RECORDING SYSTEM PROTECTS TAYLOR 
AS A SUBSEQUENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE, WITHOUT NOTICE, 
WHO RECORDED FIRST. 
Even if this Court finds that Utah's after-acquired title statute effected a 
conveyance to Centennial of a Property interest not subject to Taylor's September 
5,2006 Deed of Trust, Utah's race-notice recording system protects Taylor as a 
subsequent purchaser for value, without notice, who recorded first. 
§ 57-3-103 protects Taylor as a subsequent purchaser because (1) at the time 
Taylor recorded his Deed of Trust on September 6, 2006, Taylor did not have 
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notice of Centennial's invalid interest in the Property and (2) Taylor recorded 
before Centennial. 
Under Utah's race-notice recording statute, a subsequent purchaser for 
value is protected against another's earlier-acquired interest if (1) the 
subsequent purchaser recorded his interest first and (2) the subsequent 
purchaser was not on notice of the earlier-conveyed interest at the time of 
the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser. Utah Code. Ann. § 57-3-103 
provides, 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or 
any portion of it, if: 
(l)the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
Utah Code. Ann. § 57-3-103 (2006). The "good faith" consideration is a question 
of notice, satisfied by any of (1) actual notice, (2) constructive notice (through 
recordation), (3) inquiry notice, or (4) "any infirmity in [] grantor's title." Salt 
Lake County v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 89 P.3d 155,158 (Utah 2004). 
Taylor, the subsequent purchaser, recorded his Deed-of-Trust interest before 
Centennial recorded its interest; Centennial's June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust was 
invalid when recorded and therefore does not predate Taylor's valid September 6, 
2006 Deed of Trust. Moslev v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 114 P.2d 740, 750 (N.M. 
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1941) ([R]ecorded invalid instrument "no more protects a purchaser than if it did 
not exist."). 
Taylor did not have notice under § 57-3-103 because Centennial's June 2, 
2006 recording of an invalid encumbrance did not serve as notice to Taylor. 
Recording of an invalid deed does not serve as notice. See Rasmussen v. Olsen. 
583 P.2d 50, 52-53 (Utah 1978) (holding that "[t]he recording of a forged deed 
gives no notice to the world or to anybody within it of the contents thereof); In re 
MacArthur, 430 B.R. 300, 304 (Bkrtcy. N.D. Ga. 2010) (citations omitted) 
(applying Georgia law) (Invalid recorded instrument does not constitute 
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers.); Mortgage. Elec. Registration Svs. 
v. Odita, 822 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ohio App. 2004) (recorded invalid mortgage is 
treated as though it had not been recorded); In re Check, 129 B.R. 492, 493 
(Bankr.N.D.Ohio.E.Div. 1991) ([IJnvalid mortgage does not provide constructive 
notice); Lloyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 310, 311 (Fla. App. 1990) 
("[Recording of a void or forged instrument cannot create legal title or protect 
those who may claim under."); Moslev v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 114 P.2d 740, 
750 (N.M. 1941) ([RJecorded invalid instrument "no more protects a purchaser 
than if it did not exist.). Because the June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust to Centennial was 
invalid (grantor had no interest to convey), such instrument provided no notice of a 
legal conveyance which would have put Taylor on notice under § 57-3-103. 
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Utah's race-notice recording system protects Taylor as a subsequent 
purchaser for value. Because Centennial's June 2, 2006 Deed of Trust was invalid 
on June 2, 2006 and on September 6, 2006 when Taylor recorded his valid Deed of 
Trust, Taylor was the first to record a valid legal instrument and did not have 
notice of any valid legal instrument when he received his Deed of Trust on 
September 5,2006. 
IV. CENTENNIAL'S THEORY CANNOT POSSIBLY BE THE LAW 
BECAUSE IT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INHIBIT THE 
ALIENABILITY AND MARKETABILITY OF LAND. 
Centennial's theory cannot possibly be the law because such a system would 
allow an invalid, essentially phantom conveyance, made and recorded by a grantor 
without any property interest at the time of conveyance, to inhibit and essentially 
halt the alienability and marketability of land. "[I]t is [] the policy of the l a w . . . to 
keep land titles clear and to encourage alienability of property rather than the 
contrary." Boyle v. Baggs. 350 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1960); Christensen v. 
Christensen. 176 P.3d 626 (Wyo. 2008) ("Generally, the law favors the free 
alienability of property interests."). Under Centennial's theory, there would be 
essentially no market to purchase any interest in land relative to which a previous 
"phantom" conveyance had been recorded, because the land would always be 
subject to immediate dispossession upon the original grantor's acquisition of any 
interest in the land. Any third-party could institute this cloud over any property 
by simply making and recording a "phantom" deed and then some time later, after 
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the property has been fully encumbered, obtain a special warranty deed of the 
owner's interest (which happens to be nothing), and by virtue of the after-acquired 
title statute, remove all prior encumbrances that were put on title after the phantom 
recording was made. Because Centennial's theory would empower any non-party 
to cloud title and discourage alienability, contrary to the "policy of the law," such 
theory cannot be the law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, Utah's after-acquired title statute failed to 
secure a first Deed of Trust from McDonald to Centennial on as of June 2, 2006, as 
Centennial contends. Centennial's legal theory fails for several reasons: (1) Utah's 
after-acquired title stature passed only the interest subsequently obtained by 
McDonald, and McDonald's subsequently-acquired interest was subject to 
Taylor's September 6, 2006 Deed of Trust; (2) the doctrine of after-acquired title 
cannot pass more to a grantee than what the grantor subsequently acquires; (3) 
Utah's race-notice recording system protects Taylor as a subsequent lender for 
value, without notice, who recorded first; and (4) Centennial's advocated legal 
theory contravenes public policy by vitiating the reason for Utah's race-notice 
system and allowing speculating non-owners to cloud title and thereby 
discouraging the alienability of real property. 
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